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Taman Siswa, with its emphasis on a national education to unite 
the various cultural and ideological segments in Indonesia, has always 
been identified with the prewar nationalist movement. Established in 
1922 by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro as the Nationaal Onderwijs Instituut "Taman 
Siswa,” the movement was to some extent a reaction to the "deracinating" 
effects of Western education.1 In Taman Siswa schools, attention was 
given to the study of what was then beginning to be accepted by some 
nationalists as the national culture. In Java, where most of the Taman 
Siswa schools were located, Javanese music, plays, and classical dances 
were taught, while Western songs and related cultural activities were 
avoided. In the teaching of history, emphasis was placed on Indone­
sia^ precolonial past. Vernacular languages were used as the media 
of instruction in the lower grades, while Malay and Dutch were taught 
only in the higher classes. English was included as a second or third 
language in the secondary schools. But above and beyond formal course- 
work, what Taman Siswa offered were educational opportunities to those 
aspiring to social mobility but who, because of low social standing, 
had encountered difficulties in gaining admittance to government 
schools.2 By the beginning of the Second World War, Taman Siswa had a 
total of 199 branches, with 207 schools, 650 teachers, and about 20,000 
pupils .
Taman Siswa attracted the support of many who regarded the organi­
zation as working towards the political objectives of national unity 
and independence. Some associated themselves with Taman Siswa because 
they believed this affiliation gave them scope to contribute to the 
cause of nationalism, particularly at a time when the Dutch were taking 
tough repressive measures against overt political activities. Conse­
quently, despite its leaders1 frowning on politics in the schools,
Taman Siswa tended to encourage the growth of anticolonial sentiments 
among its members. Such factors as the socioeconomic background of 
its pupils, the presence of radical nationalists on its teaching staff, 
Ki Hadjar Dewantorofs pedagogical approach, and its atmosphere of
1A. Zainu’ddin, "Education in the Netherlands East Indies and the Republic of 
Indonesia,” Melbourne Studies in Education (1970), pp. 30-35; B. J. Mulherin, "Ki 
Hadjar Dewantara: Indonesian Cultural Nationalist" (M.A. thesis, Queensland Univer­
sity, 1969); C. Penders, "Colonial Education Policy" (Ph.D. thesis, Australian Na­
tional University, 1967); W. le Febre, Taman Siswa (Jakarta: Balai Buku Indonesia, 
1952), pp. 12-20; Kenji Tsuchiya, "The Taman Siswa Movement--Its First Eight Years 
and Javanese Background," Journal of Southeast Asian History6, 2 (1975), pp. 164- 
177; and R. Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: van 
Hoeve, 1960), pp. 220-22.
2Ruth T. McVey, "Taman Siswa and the Indonesian National Awakening," Indonesia> 
4 (October 1967), p. 146.
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cultural nationalism--all contributed to a heightened political con­
sciousness. By the time the 1932 Taman Siswa congress was held, there 
was already a large group of political activists within the organiza­
tion, many of whom were also members of the Partai Indonesia (Partindo) 
and the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (residues of Sukarno’s banned 
PNI) .
Following independence, however, Taman Siswa was no longer as im­
portant and purposeful an organization as it had once been. It seemed 
to have difficulty in adjusting to a postindependence situation where 
many of the initiatives in educational change now came from an Indone­
sian government. Amidst a rapid expansion of government schools and 
the infusion of nationalism into the general education system, Taman 
Siswa was unable to establish a new and meaningful role. Increasingly, 
it survived simply as an appendix of the state school system. At best, 
it served as the custodian of Ki Hadjar Dewantoro’s teachings as well 
as a memorial of its own past role in the struggle for independence.
In comparison with other private schools, the postwar growth of Taman 
Siswa was slow. It failed to attract exceptional students even of 
humble background. Only those children who were unable to get into or 
continue in the government system sought places in its schools.
In the postrevolutionary period, then, Taman Siswa existed almost 
entirely as an educational body and no longer represented broader ob­
jectives. Other important private educational organizations, such as 
Muhammadiyah, the Christian schools, the Chinese Baperki (Badan Permu- 
sjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, Consultative Body for Indonesian 
Citizenship), the pro-PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Commu­
nist Party) Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Women’s Move­
ment) , the Lembaga Pendidikan Nasional (National Education Institute), 
and even the Islamic madrasah or religious schools were attached to 
groups identified by religion, ideology, or race, and their schools 
met particular community needs. Taman Siswa, however, seemed to have 
lost a definable constituency.
Yet despite this obvious decline, in many respects the organiza­
tion still had meaning in Indonesia after 1945. To many, it was a 
reminder of the country’s heroic nationalist past.3 In the colonial 
period, it had developed and offered an education which many Indone­
sians could claim as designed for them as Indonesians . Consequently, 
Taman Siswa leaders continued to be highly regarded in the field of 
education as well as in politics. They were regularly invited to sit 
on the government’s numerous committees or consultative bodies on edu­
cation. Ki Hadjar Dewantoro was appointed Minister of Education in 
the very first Republican cabinet and was subsequently called on to 
advise the government on several occasions.4 Another Taman Siswa 
leader, Sarino Mangunpranoto, was Education Minister during the second 
Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet. Some people who had been active Taman 
Siswa members in the prewar years were now drawn into the state schools 
and the educational bureaucracy, and a number of them assumed leader­
3In November 1959, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro was proclaimed a national hero, and a 
month later his birthday, May 2, was declared a national holiday.
4"Keterangan Ki Hadjar Dewantoro tentang kembalinja aktif didalam usaha Taman 
Siswa," Pusara_, 14, 9-12 (January-March 1953), p. 187.
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ship in teachers’ organizations. Moreover, simply as an educational 
organization, the Taman Siswa still had more than a hundred schools, 
including its own teachers’ training colleges, and it therefore re­
mained a significant private school system.5
The problem faced by the postwar Taman Siswa was that of adjusting 
itself to what was clearly a different political environment and of 
seeking a role in a new educational system.6 In the prewar era, it 
had rejected the Dutch government’s educational system and had tried 
to have as little to do with the colonial authorities as possible. 
Despite perennial financial difficulties, Taman Siswa had always re­
fused to seek assistance from Batavia, arguing that to do this would 
compromise its principles. This stand bore heavy costs, including in­
adequate school facilities and low pay for its teachers. Yet these 
hardships were bravely borne by most members of the organization, who 
regarded their economic difficulties as necessary sacrifices for the 
nationalist cause. But now that the government was in Indonesian 
hands, such sacrifices no longer had the same moral compellingness.
The Role of the Taman Siswa in 
Postrevolutionary Education
One issue that soon led Taman Siswa to a reexamination of its 
position was that of government subsidies. There were members who pro­
posed that the organization should take advantage of government offers 
of assistance. Facing constant financial difficulty, they saw no rea­
son why such assistance should, if offered, be refused. Many Taman 
Siswa teachers could see little point in making monetary sacrifices 
under circumstances where no meaningful point was thereby being made. 
Furthermore, there were those who felt that the old oppositionist atti­
tudes of Taman Siswa were irrelevant and that the organization should 
now cooperate closely with the Education Ministry.
There was, however, considerable resistance among the Taman Siswa 
leaders to any change of policy on the subsidy issue. They argued that 
the acceptance of assistance from the government would greatly reduce
5Taman Siswa: Ten Years Preceding and Following the Second World War
Year School Pupils Year School Pupils
1932 166 11,000 1950 78 _
1933 170 11,500 1951 76 39,122
1934 172 11,169 1952 88 42,254
1935 187 11,235 1953 96 43,360
1936 184 9,015 1954 100 44,575
1937 190 12,000 1955 122 44,674
1938 196 14,627 1956 144 48,907
1939 205 14,499 1957 152 46,898
1940 204 13,500 1958 159 49,126
1941 204 12,000 1959 164 49,395
Source: "Laporan Umum Madjelis Luhur Dalam Rapat Besar ke-IX Persatuan Taman
Siswa, Maret 1960M (Unpublished report, Jogjakarta, 1960), pp. 12-13.
eTaman Siswa 30 Tahun (Jogjakarta: Madjelis Luhur Taman Siswa, 1956), p. 270.
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the freedom of Taman Siswa to pursue its own objectives. Many leaders 
feared that by seeking too eagerly to adapt itself to the new environ­
ment Taman Siswa would evolve into just another part of the general 
school system and be unable to emphasize or carry out the original 
Taman Siswa ideas. Possibly another reason was that there was an ele­
ment of pride among the older and more conservative leaders, who did 
not wish to be perceived as pleading for financial assistance. None­
theless, at a meeting of the Majelis Luhur (Supreme Council) in August 
1945 this conservative position was questioned and eventually modified. 
It was decided that the Taman Siswa would not actively seek assistance 
from the government but, if it were offered, it would be accepted.
The 1947 Taman Siswa congress, which was attended by representatives 
from all the branches, called for further change.7 In place of the 
passive policy recommended earlier by the Majelis Luhur, the congress 
passed a resolution urging the Taman Siswa actively to ask for govern­
ment financial support.8
Just before Dutch-Indonesian hostilities broke out in July 1947, 
Taman Siswa applied for and received very modest subsidies from the 
Republican government for most of its schools. With the outbreak of 
fighting, payments were disrupted but they resumed soon after the hos­
tilities ended. At the request of the Taman Siswa, the new government 
then provided assistance in the form of loans and other subsidies to 
rehabilitate many of the schools which were in disrepair.9
As the country moved into a period of comparative stability and 
recovery, the Education Ministry began to reexamine its earlier hap­
hazard allocation of aid to private institutions. While accepting the 
position that the government had the responsibility of assisting pri­
vate education, the Ministry wanted tighter control and the introduc­
tion of more stringent conditions for future awards of subsidies. In 
1954, the government publicly released its guidelines and stipulations. 
The Education Ministry ruled that only those private schools which met 
these requirements would receive assistance.
The new policy was disturbing to the Majelis Luhur, and it strength­
ened the position of those conservative members who all along had voiced 
their misgivings on the subsidy issue. The Majelis Luhur as a whole 
opposed the government’s view that aid should be conditional upon ful­
filling certain stipulations. It argued that the Education Law of 1950 
had assured every child an education, and that the government was there­
fore obliged to extend assistance to children in all schools, regard­
less of whether they were state or private institutions. It would be 
unfair for the government to discriminate in favor of its own schools.
On the principle of education for all, students in Taman Siswa schools 
were actually entitled to subsidies, especially since the government 
itself was unable to provide sufficient schools for all. Perhaps most 
disturbing of all to the Majelis Luhur were the actual conditions out­
7"Usul-usul tjabang tentang Pendidikan,” Pusara, 18 (April-August 1956), pp . 59-77.
QTaman Siswa 30 Tahun3 pp. 270-74; and T,Taman Siswa dapat tundjangan Rp.
2,500,000," Pewarta P.P.K., 4-5 (1956), p. 531.
9"Tentang Subsidi," Pusara, 1 (May 1950), pp. 13-14; and "Putusan Rapat Besar 
Umum Taman Siswa, Maret 1950 di Jogjakarta" (Unpublished report, Jogjakarta, 1950), 
pp. 6-8, 14-17.
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lined by the government, for these were seen as adversely affecting 
the independence of private educational organizations. The Majelis 
claimed that Taman Siswa was not opposed, for instance, to accepting 
government supervision, one of the conditions for receiving a subsidy. 
In fact it welcomed the government's ideas in this regard as possibly 
beneficial. Yet it also expressed its fear that the regulations might 
be interpreted or used by officials in a manner that would adversely 
affect Taman Siswa's development.10
It is apparent that the Taman Siswa leaders believed that because 
of the organization's historic role and the ideals for which it stood, 
it merited special recognition from the government in the form of ex­
emption from the Education Ministry's subsidy conditions.11 Acceptance 
of the regulations would mean an abdication of its special status.
Nonetheless, Taman Siswa failed to persuade the Education Ministry 
to adopt a more accommodating policy. Relations between Taman Siswa 
leaders and Ministry officials remained distinctly cool. One signifi­
cant factor that may help explain the poor relationship was the Taman 
Siswa ideal of dedication and sacrifice. Many Taman Siswa members held 
that even after independence such qualities were important, and they 
criticized the lack of education among teachers and officials of the 
Education Ministry. These feelings were best expressed by Mohd. 
Tauchid, one of the Taman Siswa leaders, in an article in Pusava, where 
he discussed the position of the Taman Siswa on teachers' unions. The 
article was written in response to queries from members who wanted to 
know if they ought to join such unions. Tauchid sharply distinguished 
the Taman Siswa from the rest of society. He described the organiza­
tion as a family in which there were no class distinctions nor differ­
entiated levels of authority. This being the case, trade unionism as 
such was not necessary in Taman Siswa. Outside of Taman Siswa, how­
ever, the ideals of a classless society had not been attained. Accord­
ingly, unions were needed in the struggle for a just return to the 
workers. On this principle, the Taman Siswa supported unionism.
The Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia [PGRI] is a union of teachers 
whose responsibility is to educate children, a responsibility which 
we share. However, we do not place much importance on the question 
of fighting for improved salaries, because the Taman Siswa community 
is different from the world of labor. The PGRI is fighting for a 
society which we already have. But we must assist them. There is 
no need to demand an improved salary here since we pay ourselves.12
But even so, support for the PGRI, the principal teachers' union 
in Indonesia, was not unqualified. Tauchid explained that teaching was 
unlike other professions. Where industrial unions could use the strike 
as an instrument to achieve their demands, it was questionable whether 
teachers should employ similar tactics, as the ultimate victims of any 
such disputes would be their students. The teachers’ first responsi­
bility was the children.
1°"Laporan Umum Madjelis Luhur," p. 115.
11"Subsidi/bantuan Pemerintah," Pusara, 18 (April-August 1956), pp. 53-58.
12Mohd. Tauchid, "Taman Siswa dan Perdjuangan Buruh," Pusara, 1 (May 1950),
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Accordingly, although Tainan Siswa did not rule against its members 
joining labor organizations, members of the Majelis Luhur, including 
Tauchid, privately clung to the idealistic view, carried over from the 
prewar period, that teachers should be prepared to make sacrifices, 
even at the cost of having to lead a spartan life. Taman Siswa leaders 
did concede that teachers needed realistic wages to provide the basic 
necessities of life. But they maintained that it was the responsibil­
ity of the community and of the government to ensure that the needs of 
the teachers be met. Taman Siswa was critical of the fact that teach­
ers and administrators in the state schools and in the Education Minis­
try increasingly seemed to view teaching simply as a profession and a 
career, thereby losing sight of what it believed to be the essential 
moral qualities required of educators.
To some extent, the factor of professionalism had another impor­
tant effect on the position of the Taman Siswa vis-S-vis the Education 
Ministry. It served to emphasize the separation of two groups of pre­
war educators--Taman Siswa and non-Taman Siswa. The members of the 
latter group, who had been trained by the Dutch and were part of the 
colonial educational system, were, with independence, absorbed into 
the new state education system. Their skills were regarded as rele­
vant to prevailing needs, and it was they who were called upon to func­
tion as educational administrators and technocrats to help formulate 
national educational programs. Meanwhile, the Taman Siswa group, which 
had been an integral part of the nationalist movement and which had 
helped to pioneer national education, now discovered that its ideas 
were deemed unimportant in the new language of postwar education. With 
this trend, Taman Siswa leaders gradually found themselves isolated 
from the state educational system in much the same way, although for 
different reasons, as they had been separated from the colonial educa­
tional system in the past. This isolation was all the more galling in 
that Taman Siswa leaders felt strongly that the organization had a 
worthwhile educational experience of its own to offer, formed during 
the struggle against the Dutch. In addition they had developed out of 
Dewantoro's teachings what they claimed was a coherent and distinct 
body of educational ideas.13 *
If it viewed the Education Ministry and its teachers as being too 
professional, Taman Siswa was in turn criticized for its lack of pro­
fessionalism. Ministry officials believed that the organization did 
not measure up to the standards and requirements of modern state educa­
tion institutions. Taman Siswa teachers were judged to be ill-quali­
fied, standards in their schools were not studiously maintained, and 
equipment was invariably lacking. Most officials also felt that the 
organization had outlived its role and usefulness. In general, they 
argued that Taman Siswa was no different from any other private organi­
zation and that, like its competitors, it should be subjected to the 
guidelines prepared by the Ministry. As they saw it, the nation was 
faced with immense and complex educational problems to which the ideas 
that Taman Siswa had developed some twenty-odd years previously could 
only marginally contribute. For these officials, it was to be from the 
government and the Education Ministry, where many of the technocratic
i3nprasaran tentang hubungan Taman Siswa dengan dunia luar," Pusara, 18 (April-
August 1956), pp. 45-50.
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skills lay, that all initiatives for change in the field of education 
should come .1
Given the fact that it was no longer a symbol of national aspira­
tions and that no special attention was accorded to it by the Education 
Ministry, Taman Siswa had to compete with other educational institu­
tions both for students and for influence in the field of education.
In both respects it invariably lost out. Most people regarded its 
ideas as irrelevant; and as an organization it no longer served as an 
asylum for political activists or the discontented. Taman Siswa was 
now judged solely by the ability with which it was able to function 
within the new system, not by the ideals it represented. One reflec­
tion of the declining influence of Taman Siswa was the level of moti­
vation among its teachers. In the prewar period, many of the people 
who assisted in the Taman Siswa schools were deeply committed to ideas 
such as national independence and national identity and sought to 
achieve these through participation in the schools. After the war, 
few possessed such aspirations any longer. To the new teachers, teach­
ing in the Taman Siswa was a job no different from any other. The type 
of students who now attended Taman Siswa also gave cause for dismay. 
Taman Siswa leaders increasingly realized that their organization was 
simply taking in dropouts from other schools or students who generally 
had not performed well. Parents sent their children to Taman Siswa 
schools only after they failed to be accepted elsewhere. In its report 
to the 1960 congress, the Majelis Luhur acknowledged: "Many people who
send their children to Taman Siswa schools do not do so because they 
share the Taman Siswa ideas and beliefs. We can see this fact in the 
observation that our students in the Taman Dewasa or the Taman Madya 
and Taman Guru are in fact those who do not have a place in the state 
schools."15
The Majelis Luhur correctly perceived the reasons for this trend. 
By comparison to its own schools, the state and Christian private 
schools had better examination results, and parents concerned about 
the diplomas and certificates required for the career prospects of 
their children naturally chose these schools. The Majelis Luhur, how­
ever, was critical of this attitude. It commented that "although our 
society has gone through a revolution, yet clearly its attitude with 
regard to the problem of education has not changed much from the colo­
nial period. Society continues to value education that is intellec­
tual."16 17 The attack on intellectualism here was really a reference to 
the preoccupation with selective study directed towards examinations, 
to the neglect of what Taman Siswa leaders thought was a more complete 
education in which the inculcation of vocational skills and the appre­
ciation of the arts and culture were among the most important fea­
tures . 1 7
But merely deploring society’s attitude was not an adequate answer 
to the crisis. Even those who did send their children to Taman Siswa, 
mainly people from the lower-middle and the working classes, attached
1z+Interview with Soegarda Poerbakawatja, head of the Jawatan Pengajaran Umum 
(1949-57), Jakarta, April 23, 1971.
15,lLaporan Umum Madjelis Luhur," p. 25. 16Ibid., p. 15.
17Speech of Wardojo at the opening of the Taman Siswa conference, 1969, in Taman 
Siswa dan Pembaharuan Pendidikan (Jogjakarta: Majelis Luhur Taman Siswa, 1969), p. 6.
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great importance to schooling as a means toward a better job. Inevi­
tably, then, Taman Siswa had to make adjustments in its thinking and 
organization in order to survive. In fact, in an early response to 
this need, many members of the Majelis Luhur had, in the months imme­
diately after the war, advocated changes in the Taman Siswa curriculum 
to bring it closer to that of the state schools. Demands and pressures 
for curriculum revision had come particularly from branches in areas 
where the establishment of state schools had undermined whatever influ­
ence Taman Siswa schools once had. The right changes, Majelis Luhur 
leaders believed, would enable Taman Siswa students to sit for state 
examinations--and therefore not miss out on opportunities for higher 
education or jobs--and yet the essential Taman Siswa values could still 
be preserved.
The matter of school curriculum was the main subject of discussion 
at the Seventh Congress of the Taman Siswa in 1952. As on the subsidy 
issue, calls for curriculum change encountered resistance from the 
older members, who feared that any revision would endanger all that 
the Taman Siswa had stood for. Eventually, a compromise was reached 
which significantly changed the orientation of the Taman Siswa schools. 
The compromise arrangement was described as the konkordansi (concor­
dance) and the konpergensi (convergence) formulae.18 Under this 
arrangement, the primary and secondary schools of the Taman Siswa sys­
tem- -the Taman Indira, the Taman Muda, and the Taman Dewasa-- which 
formed the great majority of its schools and which had to compete with 
the state schools for students, would follow the curriculum set by the 
Education Ministry. Each level and grade of the Taman Siswa schools 
would be patterned according to those of the state schools. This was 
the "concordance" part of the proposal. The change meant that students 
in Taman Siswa schools could prepare for state examinations and have 
similar opportunities for higher education or improved job prospects 
as students from state schools. Students could leave Taman Siswa at 
any point to attend other types of schools, and vice versa, without 
difficulties or serious disruptions. In line with the ’’concordance” 
idea, Taman Siswa began accepting appointment of teachers from the 
government as part of the Education Ministry’s assistance program.
According to the concept of konpergensi, however, the teacher­
training Taman Guru, from which the main body of Taman Siswa teachers 
was drawn, was to remain a separate entity. This separation would 
allow Taman Siswa the opportunity to place more stress on its ideas 
when teaching student-teachers, while still retaining the essence of a 
state curriculum.19
Contrary to expectations, however, these changes did not improve 
the standing of Taman Siswa schools. Now that Taman Siswa was partici­
pating in the state examinations, its students’ abilities could easily 
be compared with those of other schools. In general, they did not 
fare very well, owing to inadequate facilities, a lack of properly 
trained teachers, and the continuing reality that a large number of 
its students were either rejects or dropouts from elsewhere. The
18,,Konpergensi dan konkordansi/’ Pusara, 18 (April-August 1956), p. 44; and 
K. H. Dewantoro, ’’Konkordansi dan konvergensiPusara, 14 (January-March, 1953), 
pp. 189, 192.
19”Laporan Umum Madjelis Luhur,” p. 25.
49
appointment of government teachers did not noticeably improve the 
s ituation.
One of the reasons why there had been so much resistance to change 
in Taman Siswa was undoubtedly the dominance in the Majelis Luhur of 
that generation of leaders who had been with the organization almost 
from the start. By far the most important of these was Ki Hadjar 
Dewantoro, who despite ill health remained Taman SiswaTs top leader 
until his death in 1959.
During the early 1950s, however, two noticeably different atti­
tudes emerged among the Taman Siswa leaders. One group favored total 
disinvolvement, especially in relation to the state education system.
It wanted neither interference from the Education Ministry nor finan­
cial assistance, which it feared would undermine the organization’s 
identity. This group preferred that Taman Siswa exist as an indepen­
dent body and pursue its own ideals in relative isolation. Taman Siswa 
should quietly work to persuade the rest of society to accept its con­
cept of national education. One can perhaps see here hints of a yearn­
ing for a monastic or pesantren type of separateness.20 The second 
group in the Majelis Luhur, accepting the fact that Indonesian society 
had moved significantly away from its prewar condition, was generally 
more responsive to calls for change. They believed that the expertise 
and the experience of Taman Siswa*s members could and should be uti­
lized by the Education Ministry in developing national education poli­
cies if the appropriate adaptations were made.21
Those who adopted this second view, such as Mohd. Tauchid and 
Sarino Mangunpranoto, were men who had been deeply involved in activi­
ties outside of Taman Siswa. Many of them had participated in prewar 
politics and continued to be associated with various political parties 
in the postrevolutionary period. Tauchid, for example, was a member 
of the ruling council of the Partai Sosialis (PS, Socialist Party) in 
its early years and later was active in the PSI (Indonesian Socialist 
Party). In October 1945, he had been elected head of the Barisan Tani 
Indonesia’s (Indonesian Peasant League) information section. Beginning 
in 1947, he had served as a member of the revolutionary parliament, 
the KNIP (Komit§ Nasional Indonesia Pusat, the Central Indonesian 
National Committee), and later represented the Republic in the larger 
federal parliament. Yet throughout this period he was also actively 
involved in Taman Siswa; indeed since 1938 he had been a member of the 
Majelis Luhur.22 Sarino Mangunpranoto, on the other hand, belonged to 
the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party) and 
served as a cabinet minister in the second Ali Sastroamidjojo govern­
ment. Mohd. Tachir Huseini, Imam Soekemi, Suratman, and Suprata all 
were said to have been closely associated with either the PSI or the 
PNI.
By contrast, members of the Majelis Luhur who favored a more iso­
lationist position had generally dissociated themselves from politi­
cal activities. Both Soedarminta, the chairman of Taman Siswa, and
2°Interview with Mohd. Said, head of the Jakarta Taman Siswa, Jakarta, June 1,
1971.
21 Interview with Mohd. Tauchid, member of Taman Siswa’s Majelis Luhur and cur­
rently its chairman, Jogjakarta, August 14, 1971.
220rang Indonesia Jang Terkemoeka di Djawa (Jakarta: Gunseikanbu, 1944), p. 412.
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Sajoga belonged to this group.23 Mohd. Said, although called upon 
later to serve on various government committees, sought to avoid en­
tanglements with political parties and tended to identify himself with 
the Soedarminta, or murni group, as they were sometimes called. The 
term murni, meaning "pure," was used to describe their concern for 
keeping themselves and the organization uninvolved in party politics, 
an issue which by this time had become a point of contention within 
Taman Siswa.* 2**
Many of the gradual changes in the organization after the revolu­
tion were really the result of demands from younger and more radical 
members. While the Tauchid group had been sympathetic to change, many 
of the initiatives and much of the pressure had come from the branches. 
Many leaders outside Taman Siswa1s spiritual home, Jogjakarta, had 
watched with growing dismay what they felt was the gradual isolation 
and decline of the organization in the new Indonesian society and were 
deeply concerned that Taman Siswa was becoming irrelevant. Though the 
Tauchid group, by comparison to the murni group, was prepared to make 
some changes, the younger and more radical members felt that the changes 
were not sufficient to arrest the erosion of Taman Siswa1s position.
That the questioning of Taman Siswa1s role often came from its 
regional branches was certainly due in part to their geographical dis­
tance from the pervasive and often stifling influence of the Majelis 
Luhur in Jogjakarta. But the main factor was the extremely rapid 
postrevolutionary expansion of state schools into areas where Taman 
Siswa had once had little competition. Younger Taman Siswa members 
quickly recognized that good students would continue to be drawn away 
unless Taman Siswa offered an education of competitive quality. Fur­
thermore, many in the younger group had frequent content with non-Taman 
Siswa groups and were therefore exposed to a wider range of ideas and 
challenges than were their elders. These groups included teachers 
seconded to Taman Siswa by the Education Ministry. These seconded 
teachers were invariably less familiar with and certainly less com­
mitted to Taman Siswa ideals than their colleagues. They brought with 
them experiences from their previous training and no doubt encouraged 
a more critical attitude towards conditions in Taman Siswa schools and 
the conservatism of the Majelis Luhur.
Another factor that added to the expression of dissatisfaction 
was the increasing politicization of the Taman Siswa organization it­
self. In the elections of 1955 and 1957, various organizations, in­
cluding Taman Siswa, found themselves the foci of intense competition 
among political parties anxious to gain their support. Although re­
garded as an institution of diminishing influence, Taman Siswa nonethe­
less received considerably attention from these parties. The affilia­
tion of Taman Siswa members with political parties was, as noted 
earlier, not new; many had been politically active in the past. Taman 
Siswa itself had no rule against members participating in politics, 
although as an organization it sought to stay neutral in all matters
230thers who probably belonged to this group were Suwandi, Pronowidigdo, Wono- 
bojo, Tjokrodirdjo, and Puger. Suwandi and Pronowidigdo had been in the Majelis 
Luhur since 1934.
2**Interview with Drs. Abdulrachman Surjomihardjo, member of Taman Siswa and 
presently a lecturer in history at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, April 8, 
1971.
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that had overtones of political or religious controversy.25 In the 
prewar years, Tainan Siswa felt itself in congruence with the broad 
political aims of the existing parties, all of which were working for 
the country’s independence. But in the postwar period, party politics 
increased dissent within the organization. Many members who were ideo­
logically committed to change in the wider society recognized that 
they would be inconsistent if they did not demand reforms of Taman 
Siswa as well.26 (In all of these growing internal conflicts, per­
sonal pettiness and rivalries were not unimportant.)
Taman Siswa and the PKI
The party that made the most impressive inroads into Taman Siswa 
was the PKI. That the Taman Siswa should have produced pro-PKI educa­
tors and supporters is not surprising, given the fact that the organi­
zation had always had a nonpartisan and accommodating approach to all 
political ideologies. In the prewar period, many radical nationalists 
were associated with Taman Siswa, and at one point allegations were 
made by the Dutch that several Taman Siswa branches were controlled by 
PKI partisans. In the postwar years, several PKI leaders, the most 
prominent of whom was Wikana, were Taman Siswa products. As a result, 
the PKI had found it relatively easy to gain early support in Taman 
Siswa. As early as the mid-fifties, there were reports that several 
branches in Central and East Java were dominated by pro-PKI members. 
Pro-PKI members were also said to have gained significant influence 
in the Persatuan Pemuda Taman Siswa (PPTS, Taman Siswa Youth Organiza­
tion) and the Taman Guru.27
The PKI’s relative success can be explained by several other fac­
tors as well. Perhaps the most important was the apparent affinities 
between the party’s ideology and the Taman Siswa world view. Even 
some of the language and imagery used by the PKI were very close to 
those of Taman Siswa. Taman Siswa referred to itself as a community 
with no hierarchy and no social classes. All were equal in the organi­
zation, which was viewed as a sort of family or keluarga.28 Taman 
Siswa spoke out against exploitation of one group by another and
25Pusara, 17 (May 1955), p. 48; "Prasaran tentang hubungan Taman Siswa,” p. 50.
26From interviews with Drs. Abdulrachman Surjomihardjo, Mohd. Said, and Mohd. 
Tauchid.
27,,Laporan Madjelis Luhur Taman Siswa Untuk Kongress ke-sepuluh Persatuan 
Taman Siswa, 5-10 Desember 1966 di Jogjakarta” (Unpublished report, Jogjakarta),
pp. 1-8.
28”It is on this principle of kekeluargaan that a society must be built if it 
seeks to be harmonious, orderly, and peaceful, free from unjust discrimination based 
on class, color, or race and free from exploitation of man by man. . . . That’s why 
Taman Siswa is organized in such a way that there is no relationship of employer- 
employee in the capitalistic sense, and neither in the social status between teachers 
teaching in secondary schools and those teaching in primary schools, nor among those 
doing intellectual, administrative, or manual work. To Taman Siswa every kind of 
work is dignified as far as it is humane or not violating universal moral standards.” 
Mohd. Said, Taman Siswa: Its Principles and Practice (Jogjakarta: Majelis Luhur 
Taman Siswa, 1972), pp. 16-17.
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frowned on the acquisition of excessive wealth for its own sake. Some 
Taman Siswa members believed in building a community in which no member 
would suffer privations and where earnings would be shared. Frugality 
was generally encouraged, and a spirit of sacrifice and service de­
manded. Moreover, as an organization that had grown from the nationalist 
movement, Taman Siswa1s image was consistent with that of the PKI on 
issues of anticolonialism and anti-imperial ism.
It should not be forgotten that the Taman Siswa members belonged, 
culturally and socially, to the community to which the PKI most ap­
pealed.29 Culturally, Taman Siswa had always been a predominantly 
Javanese organization and its members adhered mainly to what Geertz 
has called the priyayi-abangan tradition. Most of Taman Siswa’s 
branches were in Central and East Java, with the main concentration in 
the Jogjakarta region. In class terms, the majority of Taman Siswa 
members were lower-middle or lower class. Most of the students, too, 
were drawn from poorer income groups.
It has been suggested that the growing influence of the PKI in 
Taman Siswa developed from the large number of teachers seconded to it 
by the Education Ministry during the 1950s. It was later claimed that 
many of these teachers were members or sympathizers of the PKI and 
that their appointment was part of a deliberate plan by the Ministry 
to strengthen communism in Taman Siswa. Such a scheme, it was alleged, 
was made with the knowledge of the Education Minister, Prijono, who 
was regarded as sympathetic to the PKI.30 This seems unlikely. While 
the presence of a large number of non-Taman Siswa teachers undoubtedly 
exposed the organization to outside influences, communism was certainly 
only one of these. Furthermore, it would not be surprising in any case 
if a significant proportion of the appointed teachers were PKI sympa­
thizers, since by this time the communist party had successfully at­
tracted many teachers to its ranks, especially those with low status 
and salaries. In fact, the fifties saw active interest in the Taman 
Siswa from other groups as well; other parties, especially the PNI, 
were just as deeply involved.
Party activities and increased political factionalism within Taman 
Siswa were in large part due to the 1955 general elections, which en­
couraged the parties to try to build up support in various organiza­
tions and institutions. In the 1955 general elections, and later in 
the 1957 local elections, the PKI polled very well in Central and East 
Java. Indeed in the 1957 elections, the PKI obtained even more votes 
in Central Java than the PNI, which had expected to win the major share 
of seats. Thus the PKI’s growing influence in the Taman Siswa branches 
of Central and East Java should basically be understood in the context 
of its impressive electoral gains.
Leaders of the pro-PKI group in Taman Siswa tended to be younger 
and better educated. Many of them had studied at Gajah Mada University 
and the Institut Keguruan Ilmu Pengetahuan and were strongly influenced 
by a few of the strongly pro-PKI lecturers there. They saw themselves 
as the best qualified segment of the Taman Siswa leadership and were
29Rex Mortimer, "Class, Social Cleavage and Indonesian Communism," Indonesia, 
8 (October 1969), pp. 1, 20.
30Interview with Mohd. Tauchid, Jogjakarta, August 14, 1971.
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therefore impatient with the older generation of Dutch-educated but 
nonuniversity members in the Majelis Luhur.
Many of these younger members began to look beyond the Taman Siswa 
for channels to express their views, while others were determined to 
work for change within the organization. Those who decided to work 
outside of the Taman Siswa soon established contact with pro-PKI 
bodies, such as the Lembaga Pendidikan Nasional (National Education 
Institute), the Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia (Association of Indonesian 
Scholars), and the Universitas Rakyat (People’s University). The 
choice for some was primarily ideological. For others, it was simply 
that these organizations happened to be expanding their activities and 
therefore offered welcome opportunities. Still others moved into non­
political and strictly profit-motivated educational institutions. Un­
doubtedly, in all cases there was a quest for personal advancement and 
an expectation that working in Jakarta could lead to immediate gain 
and possibly to participation in the political process.
There were, however, many pro-PKI members who remained inside 
Taman Siswa in Jogjakarta. They proved very successful in influencing 
the PPTS, the Taman Guru, and several branches. Both the Jakarta and 
the Jogjakarta groups apparently worked closely together. Even though 
the Jakarta group busied itself with educational issues in the capital, 
it continued to be attentive to what was happening in Taman Siswa's 
"home." It is possible that those in Jakarta acted as a link between 
the Jogjakarta radicals and PKI educational bodies in the capital; 
they also served both within and outside Taman Siswa as the articula­
tors of new educational ideas that proved attractive to the younger 
and more restless members.
Given the political atmosphere of the late fifties, it could also 
be said that many of those Taman Siswa members who were drawn to the 
pro-PKI faction were people excited by Sukarno's ideas on Guided Democ­
racy. They were attracted to his theme of "the unfinished revolution" 
and his stress on "national greatness," and as much as anyone else 
they gave enthusiastic support to his campaign to recover West Irian 
from the Dutch. In their fervor, they backed the moves of the radical 
faction to mobilize Taman Siswa behind the President and his programs, 
and they identified the changes they wanted in Taman Siswa with imme­
diate national goals.
In many ways, the pro-PKI faction came to represent the desire of 
those members, especially those in the PPTS and the Taman Guru, who 
believed that the Taman Siswa ought to work more closely with the Edu­
cation Ministry than was then the case. Part of this feeling was 
guided by their view that while the ideas of Education Minister Prijono 
were in accordance with those of Dewantoro, as well as being relevant 
to the country's needs, Taman Siswa under its existing leadership was 
no longer the revolutionary organization it once had been. They be­
lieved that it was increasingly anachronistic because it was led by 
old and conservative leaders who seemed more anxious to live on the 
glories of the past than take on the challenges of a changing society.
In seeking to draw Taman Siswa into Prijono's education program, 
pro-PKI members called for the implementation of Sukarno's political 
doctrines of Manipol-Usdek. In an article published in December 1960, 
entitled "Taman Siswa and the Political Manifesto," the pro-PKI group
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argued that Manipol was consistent with Taman Siswa principles.31 
Quoting at length from Dewantoro’s book Demokrasi dan Leidersehap, the 
article maintained that Taman Siswa had long fought for the objectives 
which Manipol had now formalized. It further argued that the concepts 
of Guided Democracy and Guided Economy, the core ideas of Manipol, 
were fully consistent with the ideals of Taman Siswa.
Proposals were subsequently made to the Majelis Luhur by the pro- 
PKI group that positive steps be taken to implement Manipol-Usdek in 
Taman Siswa schools. Indoctrination courses should be established for 
the teachers to ensure a proper appreciation of Sukarno’s ideas. Such 
political courses ought to be given both at Jogjakarta and at the 
branches; if sufficient expertise was not available within Taman 
Siswa1s own ranks, outsiders should be called in. While they did not 
say so openly, the pro-PKI group probably meant by ’’outsiders” the 
formulators of Panca Wardhana32 and the PKI-sponsored Panca Cinta.33 
They also called for revision of the Taman Siswa curriculum, proposed 
including Manipol-Usdek and Panca Sila as subjects of instruction, and 
urged adoption of the Education Ministry’s Sapta Usaha Tama3* as a 
general guide for school activities.35 The implications of these sug­
gestions were not lost upon the Tauchid group, who saw them as further 
moves to ’’infiltrate” Taman Siswa.
The enthusiastic response of the younger Taman Siswa members to 
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy was by no means shared by their elders.
The murni group, in general, was anxious to keep the organization out 
of any politics at all. The others, however, and especially Mohd. 
Tauchid, accepted the fact that the Majelis Luhur must be prepared to 
accommodate the new symbols and vocabulary emanating from the Educa­
tion Ministry. Such accommodation would at least be a way of neutral­
izing excessive pressure and interference from the groups supporting 
Prijono. The Tauchid group were not always comfortable with the new 
political language, but, so long as Taman Siswa remained independent, 
they would still be relatively free to interpret this language in their 
own way. Pro-PKI members, on the other hand, recognized that by asso­
ciating Taman Siswa with Prijono’s Education Ministry and with pro-PKI 
educational organizations, the process of radicalizing Taman Siswa 
would be greatly facilitated. Changes within the Taman Siswa could be 
accomplished more easily once an initial formal acceptance of some 
outside influence had been achieved.
31’’Taman Siswa dan Manipol-Usdek, 17 Desember 1960,” in ’’Laporan Madjelis Luhur 
Harian 1960-1964 untuk Rapat Madjelis Luhur ke-III tanggal 16-21, Mei 1961" (Unpub­
lished report, Jogjakarta) .
32Panca Wardhana consisted of the five principles of education upon which 
Guided Democracy education was proposed to be based.
33Panca Cinta (Five Loves) was always identified as a set of precepts proposed 
by the PKI to be inculcated in the schools.
3*Sapta Usaha Tama (Seven Chief Endeavors) was introduced by Prijono in August 
1959 partly to demonstrate that changes in education were underway with the return 
of the country to presidential rule. It consisted of seven areas of activities to be 
carried out in all schools, with the aim of reviving national awareness and patri­
otism.
35”Sidang ke-II, 20 Februari 1962," in "Notulen Rapat Madjelis Luhur ke-IV, 
tgl. 19-24 February 1961 di Kaliurang-Jogjakarta" (Unpublished report, Jogjakarta),
pp. 16-18.
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The 19 56 congress of the Tainan Siswa revealed the strength of the 
PKI in the organization. Of the fourteen members elected to the new 
Majelis Luhur, six were men closely identified with the radicals.36 
This was an impressive gain, since in the past the Majelis Luhur had 
been totally dominated by noncommunists. Of the six members known to 
be close to the PKI, three held important posts in the six-man Majelis 
Harian, Taman Siswa*s day-to-day governing body. The deputy chairman­
ship and the posts dealing with organizational affairs and welfare 
went to pro-PKI members. Of these, the post in charge of organization 
was perhaps the most important, since the Majelis Luhur!s communication 
with the branches and the arrangement of congresses and meetings were 
entrusted to it. It was later claimed by the noncommunists that it 
was through control of this position that the pro-PKI group extended 
its influence to the branches. It was alleged, for instance, that 
many known anticommunist branches were not informed of the election to 
fill the seat left vacant by the death of Soedarminta, and as a result 
a pro-PKI member was elected.37 The pro-PKI faction in the Majelis 
Luhur also dominated Pusara, Taman Siswa's main publication. After 
1959, five of the eight editorial board members belonged to the pro- 
PKI faction.38 Most of the pro-PKI group in the Majelis Luhur and in 
positions of branch leadership had been in Taman Siswa for a long time 
and were well known within the organization. It is said that a number 
of them were close to Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. Some had proved to be 
among the most diligent and capable of the organization*s members. 
Accordingly, the pro-PKI faction attracted a strong following.
The noncommunists in the Majelis Luhur were worried by these 
trends, and especially by the outcome of the 1956 congress. Some, 
such as Mohd. Tauchid, warned that the growing influence of the PKI 
was a well-thought-out plan aimed at taking over the organization.
They suggested that branches dominated by the pro-PKI group were given 
strict instructions on how to vote at the 1956 congress and that lists 
of pro-PKI candidates were provided. As a result, the procommunists, 
voting as a block, gained a much larger proportion of seats in the 
Majelis Luhur than their actual membership strength warranted.
The fears of the noncommunists gained apparent confirmation in 
November 1958, when documents alleged to detail PKI intentions in Taman 
Siswa were said to have been intercepted. The documents and details 
of the PKI nplann were submitted anonymously to Tachir Husseini, chair­
man of the East Java Taman Siswa, by the interceptor. Tachir immedi­
ately contacted other members of the Majelis Luhur known to be opposed 
to the communists. The anonymous letter stated that twenty of the 
forty-two Taman Siswa branches in East Java had already come under the 
control of PKI sympathizers.39 A list of those branches was given.
It described the infiltration in East Java as being coordinated by 
Taman Siswa leaders in Jogjakarta with supposed PKI links, and warned 
that activities in that province were aimed at securing domination by 
the left-wing faction.
36f,Laporan Umum Madjelis Luhur," p. 16.
37Interview with Mohd. Tauchid, Jogjakarta, August 11, 1971.
3BPusara, 21 (September 1959), p. 1.
39Cited in "Rapat Panitia XI, 13 Nopember 1962," in "Notulen Rapat Madjelis 
Luhur ke-V pada tgl. 8-20 Nopember 1962 di Kaliurang-Jogjakarta" (Unpublished report, 
Jogjakarta), pp. 72-73.
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Included in the intercepted papers was a document which was de­
scribed as a report of the PKI’s subsection committee in Taman Siswa. 
(It is significant that this document’s authenticity was never denied 
by the radical faction.) According to the document, the subsection 
was formed in August 1957 with about forty-six members. By the time 
the report was made this number had increased to ninety-six, with most 
of the new support coming from the Taman Guru, the Ibu Pawiyatan 
(Women’s Organization) at Jogjakarta, and the branch at Gading (in 
Jogjakarta). All three were branches important to any group seeking 
to gain eventual control of the organization. The document also re­
ferred to a closed meeting during the fourth plenum of the PKI Central 
Committee, which was devoted entirely to the question of the party’s 
position with regard to Taman Siswa. The report of the communist sub­
section committee in Taman Siswa read in part:
In our report of the general situation [in Taman Siswa] we will not 
forget to explain the connection between Taman Siswa and the PKI.
This matter has been decided in the plenum of the Central 
Committee. There the main outline has been drawn up so that this 
educational institution could truly become a base for the PKI or a 
base for intellectual cadres. As a result, our comrades have the 
task of informing the Party regarding this national educational in­
stitution. The Party recognizes that this national education insti­
tution is anticolonial and revolutionary .**°
Upon receiving the documents the noncommunists immediately assem­
bled, but could not agree on a strategy to meet the threat. The Tau- 
chid group would probably have liked to take some action, but were 
restrained by several factors. The first of these was the prestigious 
presence of Dewantoro and the murni group. Dewantoro, it appears, was 
not convinced that there was a PKI plot to take over Taman Siswa. The 
pro-PKI members were men with whom he was closely acquainted, and their 
actions had not seemed in conflict with Taman Siswa principles. The 
murni group was also unwilling to view events within Taman Siswa in 
the framework of party politics. To them, the organization was above 
all such factionalism. According to Taman Siswa principles, the organ­
ization was open to all, irrespective of their religious or ideological 
commitments, and the murni members were therefore prepared to accept 
the communists within the organization.
A second factor was probably the PKI’s increasing acceptance at 
the level of national politics. Sukarno’s open patronage of the PKI 
probably divided the noncommunists in the Taman Siswa as to what stand 
they should take. There were those who, while opposed to the commu­
nists, were at the same time loyal supporters of the president. Many, 
too, were not sure if in fact some sympathizers of the pro-PKI faction 
were not simply pro-Sukarno. As a result, the strong anticommunists 
such as Tauchid and Tachir were not willing to risk a crisis on the 
issue at this stage and a possible split in the organization.
Around 1960 the conflict between the pro-PKI group and the non­
communists intensified and grew into an open and sometimes bitter 
struggle as each side sought to achieve control of the organization.
The quiet and polite maneuvering that had characterized the preceding 
years gave way to hostility and public denunciations, each side accusing
tf°Ibid., p. 72.
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the other of deviations from Taman Siswa* s original principles.**1 Two 
events promoted the widening rift between the two factions. First, 
Dewantoro, the founder of the movement, died in 1959 and with his death 
the strength of the moderate murni group was greatly reduced. For a 
long time Dewantorofs calming influence had provided balance and sta­
bility in the organization. There was no one else with the authority 
to play this role. Second, the Taman Siswa congress in which a new 
Majelis Luhur was to be elected was due to be held in March 1960. Non­
communist leaders in the Majelis Luhur saw this congress as a critical 
period. Although noncommunists still held an overwhelming majority in 
the Majelis Luhur, there were fears that the pro-PKI group would im­
prove on its 1956 gains and, with better organization and the benefit 
of a possible bandwagon effect, essentially take over Taman Siswa. 
Particular causes for the concern among the noncommunists were the 
realization that they themselves lacked cohesion, and continual uncer­
tainty as to where many ffneutralM members would eventually stand.
In the face of a strong challenge from the pro-PKI faction, now 
encouraged especially by political developments in Jakarta, the Tauchid 
group decided to take measures of their own to retain control of the 
Majelis Luhur. The PKI letters and reports received by Tachir were 
skillfully used by the Tauchid faction to convince the murni group of 
the dangers of a complete PKI takeover. The Tauchid faction argued 
that the dispute was not over whether Taman Siswa members should be 
allowed close affiliations with particular political groups. What was 
at issue, they maintained, was a carefully prepared communist plan, 
with the object of penetrating the organization and taking it over com­
pletely. Should this happen, the communists would destroy that prin­
ciple of free political association which the murni group was defending.
What followed was a series of shrewd and carefully organized 
attempts by Tauchid and his supporters to isolate the procommunists. 
These moves were led by Sutarto, who was entrusted with alerting 
branch leaders to the PKI threat and mobilizing the support of branches 
believed to be opposed to the communists. Others involved in the cam­
paign were Tachir, Suprapto, Hanif D.K., and Sugondo. Tachir was to 
get support from the East Java branches, Suprapto was to look after 
Central Java, Hanif was to cover South Sumatra, and Sugondo North and 
West Sumatra. Tauchid and several others with known political affilia­
tions kept a low profile, although they were active behind the scenes.42 
The immediate objective of the offensive was to organize the votes of 
the noncommunist branches in the coming congress in a manner that would 
preclude a repetition of what had happened at the 1956 Majelis Luhur 
election. It was estimated that if the noncommunists were mobilized, 
the pro-PKI group, even with its known organizational skills, could 
not be expected to win more than two seats in the Majelis Luhur. What 
immediately concerned the Tauchid group was not so much the elimination 
of the pro-PKI faction, which they realized was not possible under the 
circumstances, but the prevention of any communist gains.
The moves of the Tauchid group proved temporarily successful. In 
the elections of the seventh congress, the pro-PKI faction managed to
**1lfRapat Panitia ke-VIII, 12 Nopember 1962,M in "Notulen Rapat Madjelis Luhur
ke-V."
*+2Interview with Mohd. Tauchid, Jogjakarta, August 14, 1971.
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get only three seats, a net loss of four.**3 The results must have sur­
prised the radicals, who had been expected to do well. But the 1960 
congress really only marked the beginning of an ever more open struggle 
between the pro-PKI faction and the noncommunists. The Tauchid counter 
offensive broadened the conflict and more of the ordinary members were 
now aware of a deep division in the organization. Pro-PKI members now 
decided that a cautious and subtle approach was of little use.
Although the pro-PKI group had lost seats in the Majelis Luhur, 
its overall influence remained largely unaffected in Jogjakarta and 
the regions. It benefited from the banning of the PSI in 1960, a de­
velopment which discredited many of the strongly anti-PKI members of 
the Majelis Luhur, including Tauchid and Sajoga. (Mohd. Said, although 
a nonparty man, was always considered a PSI sympathizer.)
Its influence in the branches could even be said to have increased 
The PPTS was controlled by the pro-PKI faction, and the Taman Guru was 
staffed largely by those associated with the radicals. The Gading 
branch was also dominated by the pro-PKI faction, most of whom were 
also with the PPTS. The procommunist faction was also strong in the 
Ibu Pawiyatan. Only the Djetis branch in Jogjakarta remained solidly 
behind the Tauchid group. It was estimated eventually that half the 
branches in outlying areas in Central Java were dominated by pro­
communists, and that the proportion of pro-PKI branches in East Java 
was similarly high.
Conclus ion
Thus, by the time of the events of October 1965, Taman Siswa had 
become highly politicized and deeply divided. The issues in the dis­
pute became increasingly and inextricably tied to Jakarta politics.
In this respect the radicals had succeeded. In July 1963, the Majelis 
Luhur, which had become badly split, was dissolved and replaced by a 
Dewan Pimpinan Eksekutip (Executive Leadership Council). Its formation 
was decided on not by the Taman Siswa in Jogjakarta but by several 
leading political figures, including Sartono and Sultan Hamengku Buwono 
The composition of the new council was to be such as to reflect the 
prevailing political groupings in the country. The PKI gained a place 
in the five-man council with the appointment of Wikana.
By and large, the sorts of developments that took place in Taman 
Siswa also occurred elsewhere during the latter part of Guided Democ­
racy. What happened in Taman Siswa ought therefore to be seen in the 
larger perspective of the general contest between the PKI and its ene­
mies in the Indonesian politics of the period. The Education Ministry 
itself was divided along similar lines. The large teachers1 union, 
the PGRI, split in two in July 1964.
But the controversy in Taman Siswa was also clearly related to 
the efforts by groups within the organization to search for a more 
effective and meaningful role in postwar Indonesia. In the context of 
a rapidly developing state educational system there were many who felt 
that Taman Siswa ought to adjust to changing educational needs and de­
mands. The early fifties saw some attempts in that direction as Taman
**3f,Laporan Madjelis Luhur Taman Siswa,,f pp. 12-13.
59
Siswa agreed to accept subsidies from the government and to bring their 
schools in line with those of the Education Ministry. But despite 
these changes, Taman Siswa schools continued to compare very poorly 
with the state schools and most private institutions. Furthermore, 
the Taman Siswa leaders1 relationship with the Education Ministry re­
mained distant. Many younger members came to believe and argue that 
fundamental and far-reaching reforms ought to be adopted. The increas­
ing involvement of the PKI in educational issues and the growing iden­
tification of the Education Ministry with some of its initiatives 
provided these people with the occasion and the support to challenge 
the older leadership and at times the very premises of Taman Siswa.
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J > W 1 8  ^ 1 7
Amulet against fever, worn tied to the body.
Source: J. Kreemer, Atjeh (Leiden: Brill, 1923), 2, p. 591.
The following transliterations and translations were made by George 
El'Hage. Numbers are provided for the reader's reference only.
1. Bis 11. Wahas
2. mi 12. buna
3. alia 13. Alla
3+. h 14. h
4. arahman 15 . Wanihma
5 . alrah 16. Alwakil
6. im 17. Hema
7. Walahaula 18. la taqrubi
8. Walaquata 19. fulan bin fulana
9.
10.
ilia billah 
al ali al azim
20. Bismiallah taala
1-6. In the name of Allah the Merciful the Compassionate 
7-10. There is no strength except by God the Great the Sublime 
11-16. Our dependence is on God the Best the Protector 
17-20. Fever, you will not approach anyone son of anyone (fern.), 
by God's will.
